No. 92643-3
Court of Appeals No. 46386-5-II

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

BRIAN A. ROBERTS, II,

Petitioner.

PETITION FOR REVIEW

On review from the Court of Appeals, Division Two,
and the Superior Court of Pierce County,
Hon. Frank E. Cuthbertson, Judge

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT

WASHINGTON COURT OF APPEALS

RULES, STATUTES, CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND OTHER

OTHER AUTHORITIES

A. IDENTITY OF PETITIONER

Brian Roberts II, appellant below, petitions this Court to grant review of a portion of the unpublished decision of the court of appeals designated in section B.

B. COURT OF APPEALS DECISION

Pursuant to RAP 13.4(b)(1) and (4), Petitioner asks this Court to review a portion of the unpublished decision of Division Two of the Court of Appeals in State v. Roberts, issued on November 24, 2015 (2015 WL 7459141).[1]

C. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

> In order to impose an increased penalty on certain repeat domestic violence offenders, RCW 9.94A.525(21) requires the prosecution to prove that, for both the prior and current crime, "domestic violence" as defined in RCW 9.94A.030(20) was "plead and proved."
>
> Under RCW 9.94A.030(20), "'[d]omestic violence'" has the same meaning as defined in RCW 10.99.020 **and** RCW 26.50.010" (emphasis added).

1. Did the court of appeals err and violate fundamental rules of statutory construction by interpreting RCW 9.94A.030(20) contrary to its plain language to read the "and" as an "or," thus decreasing the prosecution's burden of proof and rendering a portion of the statute superfluous?

[1] A copy of the decision is attached hereto as Appendix A.

Further, does the court of appeals decision conflating "and" with "or" conflict with this Court's decision in Childers v. Childers, 89 Wn.2d 592, 596, 575 P.2d201 (1978)?

2. In Ski Acres, Inc. v. Kittitas County, 118 Wn.2d 852, 827 P.2d 1000 (1992), this Court found that the Legislature signals strong intent to use a specific word when it amends proposed language in a statute order to add that word. Did the court of appeals err in ignoring such changes to the relevant statute here and is its decision in conflict with this Court's decision in Ski Acres?

3. Should review be granted because the decision in this case depends upon the flawed ruling of State v. Kozey, 183 Wn. App. 692, 334 P.3d 1170 (2014), review denied, 182 Wn.2d 1007 (2015), and so expands the application of the enhanced offender/penalty provisions that it nonsensically applies in virtually every case?

D. OTHER ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

4. Should review be granted to address the issues raised by Petitioner in his pro se RAP 10.10 Statement of Additional Grounds?

E. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. Procedural facts

Petitioner Brian A. Roberts, II, entered a plea to an amended information charging three counts of violation of a domestic violence court order. CP 1-3, 8-9; RCW 10.99.020; RCW 26.50.110(5); RCW

9A.36.041(1); see RP 1-5.[2] After sentencing, he appealed and, on November 24, 2015, the court of appeals, Division Two, affirmed in part and reversed in part in an unpublished opinion. See CP 95-120; SRP 1-10. This Petition follows.

2. Facts relating to plea

In the Statement of Defendant on Plea of Guilty, Roberts stated that he "unlawfully, willfully and feloniously had contact with Christina Roushey when such contact was prohibited by a court order," and that he "had actual notice of the existence of the court order," between February 10-16, 2013 (count I), February 17-23, 2013 (count II), and February 24, 2013, and March 2, 2013 (count III). CP 19. He also said that, "with respect to each" count, he had "at least 2 prior convictions for violating no contact orders[.]" CP 19. Roushey was Roberts' ex-girlfriend. CP 19; see RP 5-8.

The specific allegations as to these counts were that Roberts had called Roushey on the phone multiple times from jail. CP 4-5.

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[2]The two volumes of the verbatim report of proceedings will be referred to as follows: the proceedings of March 11, 2014, as "RP," and the proceedings of May 29, 2014, as "SRP."

F. ARGUMENT WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE GRANTED

THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION IN THIS CASE AND IN KOZEY VIOLATES FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, CONFLICT WITH DECISIONS OF THIS COURT, IMPROPERLY RELIEVE THE PROSECUTION OF ITS BURDEN OF PROOF AND SO GREATLY EXPAND THE APPLICATION OF THE PROVISION THAT IT WOULD APPLY IN NEARLY EVERY CASE INSTEAD OF THOSE TO WHICH THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED

The question presented for review in this case is whether the court of appeals properly held that "and" means "or" when interpreting the definition of "domestic violence" contained in RCW 9.94A.030(20), despite the plain language of the statute, basic rules of statutory construction and rulings of this Court.

Under RCW 9.94A.525(21)(a), (b) and (c), where a current conviction is for a felony domestic violence offense and it is an offense "where domestic violence as defined in RCW 9.94A.030 was plead and proven," additional points are added to the offender score for prior adult convictions and juvenile adjudications in which, similarly, "domestic violence as defined in RCW 9.94A.030" was also "plead and proven." RCW 9.94A.525(21)(a), (b) and (c).

Instead of providing a specific definition of "domestic violence," however, RCW 9.94A.030(20) refers to other statutes, providing.

"'[d]omestic violence' has the same meaning as defined in RCW 10.99.020 and 26.50.010."

In this case, the court of appeals simply cited its own decision in Kozey as controlling. App. A at 3-4. In Kozey, Division Two "interpreted" the "and" clause of the definition in RCW 9.94A.030(2) and held that the statute does *not* require proof of "domestic violence" under *both* RCW 10.99.020 and RCW 26.50.010 but instead only one or the other for the enhanced provisions to apply. App. A at 3-4. Put another way, in Kozey and in this case, the court of appeals held that "and" means "or." This Court should grant review, because the court of appeals failed to apply fundamental rules of statutory construction, ignored the plain language of the statute, is in conflict with decisions of this court and rendered a provision of the statute nonsensical while at the same time so greatly expanding the scope of the increased offender score provisions that they will apply in virtually every case.

First, review should be granted, because the court of appeals failed to follow basic rules of statutory construction. A statute is not subject to "interpretation" or statutory construction if its language is "plain." See, State v. Keller, 143 Wn.2d 267, 276, 19 P.3d 1030 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1130 (2002). Instead, in such cases, the meaning of a statute

"must be derived from the wording of the statute itself." Id.

Here, the plain, unambiguous language of RCW 9.94A.030(2) in defining domestic violence requires that domestic violence under both RCW 10.99.020 *and* RCW 26.50.010 must be plead and proved in both the prior and current offense before an increased penalty through an increased offender score will apply. And this makes sense, because RCW 10.99.020 and RCW 26.50.010, do not provide the same definition of "domestic violence." Under RCW 10.99.020(5):

> Domestic violence ***includes but is not limited to*** any of the following crimes when committed by one family or household member against another:
>
> (a) Assault in the first degree (RCW 9A.36.011);
>
> (b) Assault in the second degree (RCW 9A.36.021);
>
> (c) Assault in the third degree (RCW 9A.36.031);
>
> (d) Assault in the fourth degree (RCW 9A.36.041);
>
> (e) Drive-by shooting (RCW 9A.36.045);
>
> (f) Reckless endangerment (RCW 9A.36.050);
>
> (g) Coercion (RCW 9A.36.070);
>
> (h) Burglary in the first degree (RCW 9A.52.020);
>
> (i) Burglary in the second degree (RCW 9A.52.030);
>
> (j) Criminal trespass in the first degree (RCW 9A.52.070);

(k) Criminal trespass in the second degree (RCW 9A.52.080);

(l) Malicious mischief in the first degree (RCW 9A.48.070);

(m) Malicious mischief in the second degree (RCW 9A.48.080);

(n) Malicious mischief in the third degree (RCW 9A.48.090);

(o) Kidnapping in the first degree (RCW 9A.40.020);

(p) Kidnapping in the second degree (RCW 9A.40.030);

(q) Unlawful imprisonment (RCW 9A.40.040);

(r) Violation of the provisions of a restraining order, no-contact order, or protection order restraining or enjoining the person or restraining the person from going onto the grounds of or entering a residence, workplace, school, or day care, or prohibiting the person from knowingly coming within, or knowingly remaining within, a specified distance of a location (RCW 10.99.040, 10.99.050, 26.09.300, 26.10.220, 26.26.138, 26.44.063, 26.44.150, 26.50.060, 26.50.070, 26.50.130, 26.52.070, or 74.34.145);

(s) Rape in the first degree (RCW 9A.44.040);

(t) Rape in the second degree (RCW 9A.44.050);

(u) Residential burglary (RCW 9A.52.025);

(v) Stalking (RCW 9A.46.110); and

(w) Interference with the reporting of domestic violence (RCW 9A.36.150).

Thus, for the purposes of title 10.99, the definition of "domestic violence" is extremely expansive, with the list "non-exclusive" and the only real requirement that the crime occur between "family or household members."

RCW 10.99.020(5).

In contrast, RCW 26.50.010(1) provides:

> "Domestic violence" means: (a) Physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury or assault, between family or household members; (b) sexual assault of one family or household member by another; or (c) stalking as defined in RCW 9A.46.110 of one family or household member by another family or household member.

This definition is far more limited than RCW 10.99.020(5), requiring assault, stalking, or sexual assault between family members, although not requiring that the violent acts amount to a specific crime if there is physical harm, bodily injury, assault or the infliction of fear of imminent such harm.

Instead of honoring the plain language and limited scope of the increased offender score provisions for certain "domestic violence" offenses, the court of appeals extended it. For the enhanced penalties of RCW 9.94A.525(21) to apply, the Legislature has chosen the most serious crimes involving domestic violence - those which 1) involve commission of a crime between family or household members (under RCW 10.99.020(5)) **and** 2) also involve either physical harm of some kind or infliction of "fear of imminent physical harm," regardless whether that was part of the charged crime, **or** sexual assault **or** the specific version of

stalking defined in RCW 9A.46.110 (under RCW 26.50.010(1)). This smaller subset of offenders who commit the worst domestic violence offenses repeatedly were thus singled out for greater sentences through the higher offender score resulting from application of RCW 9.94A.525(21), when it applies. But Division Two's reasoning amounts to a finding that, although the Legislature specifically chose, in RCW 9.94A.030(20), to define "domestic violence" to have "the same meaning as defined in RCW 10.99.020 **and** 26.50.010," what the Legislature really *meant* to say was "RCW 10.99.020 **or** 26.50.110."

It is a fundamental rule that a statute is not subject to "interpretation" or statutory construction if its language is "plain." See, Keller, 143 Wn.2d at 276. And an appellate court has no authority to "interpret" a statute to provide a different meaning even if it thinks the meaning of the statute was improper or did not make sense. See, State v. Groom, 133 Wn.2d 679, 689, 947 P.2d 240 (1997) (court refusing to "interpret" plain language to amend it; declaring "however much members of this court may think a statute should be rewritten, it is imperative that we not rewrite statutes to express what we think the law should be").

Further, even if it could be deemed unclear or ambiguous what the word "and" means, when construing the language of a penal statute, the "rule of lenity" required the Court to resolve any statutory ambiguities in favor of the defendant, absent clear legislative intent to the contrary. See In re Sietz, 124 Wn.2d 645, 652, 880 P.3d 34 (1994).

Review should be granted. Even if it could be unclear that the Legislature specifically chose, in crafting RCW 9.94A.030(20) and using the word "and," to select only those crimes which meet both the requirements of RCW 10.99.020 and RCW 26.50.010, the court of appeals was required to interpret the ambiguity in Roberts' favor. In this case, instead of holding to that maxim, the court followed Kozey, which declared that even if it assumed that RCW 9.94A.030(20) was ambiguous, "examination of legislative history and application of the principles of statutory construction clarify how that ambiguity is resolved, leaving no room for application of the rule of lenity." 189 Wn. App. at 1176.

But the rule of lenity *is* a rule of statutory construction. See Keller, 143 Wn.2d at 276. To interpret the statute contrary to its plain language by treating the "and" as an "or," Division Two first had to find that "and" was ambiguous, otherwise it could not have been subject to "interpretation." See Keller, 143 Wn.2d at 276 (a statute is not subject to "interpretation" or

statutory construction if its language is "plain").

Further. Division Two's decision runs afoul of this Court's clear holding in Childers, supra, that "and" and "or" should not be seen as having the same meaning in general. See 89 Wn.2d at 596.

Notably, in Ski Acres, supra, this Court specifically held that, where the legislature removes the term "or" from a proposed enactment and inserts the word "and," that is "clear evidence of legislative intent" to use "and." 118 Wn.2d at 855-56. This Court also said that, in such a situation, "[t]he Legislature would have used the word 'or' if it had intended to convey a disjunctive meaning." Id. But here, the court of appeals ignored the history of the statute which, when first proposed, would have read "RCW 10.99.020 *or* 26.50.010" but was amended to replace the "or" with "and." See Rob McKenna, AG Request Legislation - 2009 Session: Supporting Law Enforcement: Domestic Violence Sanctions, at 1 (2009) (emphasis added); see Laws of 2010, §§ 401, 403.

Finally, review should be granted because this case shows the harm which will result if Kozey remains good law. Under Kozey, as this case shows, the requirements to support the enhanced offender score meant for the worst offenders have been radically reduced. RCW 10.99.020 is a *non-exclusive* list of crimes which can be "domestic violence" crimes - so that

any crime can meet that definition, provided the crime occurs between "family and household members." See State v. Lindahl, 114 Wn. App. 1, 17-18, 56 P.3d 589 (2002), review denied, 149 Wn.2d 1013 (2003).

Under Kozey, and this case, because the "and" is now an "or," there is a nonsensical result. Because RCW 10.99.020 applies to *every* potential crime, the reference in RCW 9.94A.030(20) to RCW 26.50.010 is completely superfluous. Further, the enhanced punishment by way of the higher offender score scoring provisions of RCW 9.94A.525(21) will now apply to *every* case involving *any* crime against a family or household member. That incredibly broad interpretation of RCW 9.94A.030(20), a criminal, penal statute, is in conflict with the fundamental rules of statutory construction, decisions of this Court and the plain language the legislature chose in enacting the definition. This Court should grant review to address these issues in order to ensure that the error in Kozey and this case does not continue to recur and the prosecution is held to its proper burden of proof.

2. REVIEW SHOULD ALSO BE GRANTED ON ALL OF THE ISSUES RAISED PRO SE

Roberts filed a pro se RAP 10.10 Statement of Additional Grounds for Review ("SAG"), raising a number of issues, all of which the Court of Appeals rejected. See App. A at 1-6. Counsel was not appointed to assist

or to research the issues contained in that SAG. See RAP 10.10(f). In State v. Brett, 126 Wn.2d 136, 206, 892 P.2d 29 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1121 (1996), this Court indicated it would not address arguments incorporated by reference from other *cases*, but did not state anything about incorporation by reference of arguments or issues in the *current* case. Thus, to comply with RAP 13.7(b) and raise all issues in this Petition without making any representations about their relative merit, incorporated herein by reference are Roberts' pro se arguments, contained in his RAP 10.10 SAG. This Court should grant review on those issues.

G. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should accept review and should hold that "and" does not mean "or," as well as granting relief on the grounds raised by Petitioner pro se.

DATED this 24th day of December, 2015.

Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY EFILING/MAIL

Under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington, I hereby declare that I sent a true and correct copy of the attached Petition for Review to opposing counsel via the upload portal at the Court of Appeals, Division Two, at their official service address, pcpateecf@co.pierce.wa.us, and petitioner by depositing the same in the United States Mail, first class postage pre-paid, as follows: Mr. Brian A. Roberts, II., DOC 34642-9, Coyote Ridge CC, P.O. Box 769, Connell, WA. 99326.

DATED this 24th day of December, 2015.

/s Kathryn Russell Selk
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Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two

November 24, 2015

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. BRIAN ALLEN ROBERTS II Appellant.	No. 46386-5-II UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MELNICK, J. — Brian Allen Roberts II appeals the sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to three counts of violating a domestic violence court order. Roberts argues that the trial court erroneously misinterpreted RCW 9.94A.030(20) disjunctively to permit the court to enhance his sentence for domestic violence offenses as defined in either RCW 10.99.020 or RCW 26.50.010. Roberts also argues that the trial court lacked statutory authority to order the forfeiture of property as a condition of sentence. In his statement of additional grounds (SAG), Roberts argues further that the trial court erred by excluding a prior misdemeanor from his offender score and that his offender score for a 2012 conviction was miscalculated.

Under *State v. Kozey*, 183 Wn. App. 692, 334 P.3d 1170 (2014), *review denied*, 182 Wn.2d 1007 (2015), the trial court properly interpreted RCW 9.94A.030(20) in the disjunctive. It properly enhanced Roberts's offender score based on his current and prior domestic violence offenses. While we reject Roberts's additional claims of error concerning his offender score, we agree that the trial court lacked statutory authority to order the forfeiture of Roberts's property. We remand for the trial court to strike the forfeiture provision from Roberts's judgment and sentence, but otherwise affirm.

FACTS

Roberts pleaded guilty to three counts of violating a domestic violence court order after he telephoned his former girlfriend several times from jail. His plea statement noted that his offender score was in dispute and added that the State would recommend that Roberts "forfeit any items in Tacoma Police Department property room." Clerk's Papers at 14; Report of Proceedings (March 11, 2014) at 5.

At sentencing, the State argued that Roberts's offender score was 11 under RCW 9.94A.525(21), and the defense argued that it was 6 under RCW 9.94A.525(7).[1] RCW 9.94A.525 states the rules for computing offender scores. RCW 9.94A.525(7) is a general rule used to calculate offender scores for nonviolent offenses. RCW 9.94A.525(21) specifically relates to calculating offender scores for felony domestic violence offenses "where domestic violence as defined in RCW 9.94A.030 was plead and proven," and it provides for additional points if prior and other current offenses involved domestic violence as defined in RCW 9.94A.030. RCW 9.94A.525(21)(a)-(c). RCW 9.94A.030(20), in turn, states that domestic violence "has the same meaning as defined in RCW 10.99.020 and 26.50.010."

The State maintained that Roberts's crimes had to satisfy only one of the definitions in RCW 9.94A.030 to fall within RCW 9.94A.525(21). The State argued further that Roberts's current and prior domestic violence convictions involved domestic violence as defined in RCW 10.99.020. The defense responded that RCW 9.94A.525(21) did not apply because Roberts's

[1] Roberts had three prior convictions for robbery, theft, and malicious mischief that counted for three points. Under RCW 9.94A.525(21)(a) and (c), his current and prior domestic violence felony offenses counted for an additional six points, and his two prior domestic violence misdemeanor offenses counted for an additional two points. Under RCW 9.94A.525(7), Roberts's domestic violence felonies counted for three points and his domestic violence misdemeanors did not count at all.

domestic violence convictions did not satisfy the definitions of domestic violence in both RCW 10.99.020 and RCW 26.50.010. The defense requested a sentence under the Drug Offender Sentencing Alternative,[2] and the State argued for a standard range sentence.

The trial court agreed with the State's interpretation of RCW 9.94A.030 and sentenced Roberts to concurrent sentences of 60 months on each count. The trial court also checked a box in the judgment and sentence stating that "[a]ll property is hereby forfeited," and it added a handwritten notation ordering Roberts to "forfeit any items in property." CP at 100.

Roberts appeals his sentence.

ANALYSIS

I. OFFENDER SCORE CALCULATION

Roberts contends that the trial court misinterpreted RCW 9.94A.030 in calculating his offender score. He argues that because his current and prior domestic violence offenses did not satisfy both definitions of domestic violence in RCW 9.94A.030(20), the trial court erred in adding points to his offender score pursuant to RCW 9.94A.525(21). We considered and rejected a similar argument in *Kozey* and held that domestic violence under RCW 9.94A.030(20) has the same meaning as domestic violence in either RCW 10.99.020 or RCW 26.50.010. 183 Wn. App. at 700.

RCW 10.99.020(5) states that "'[d]omestic violence' includes but is not limited to any of the following crimes when committed by one family or household member against another." This nonexclusive list includes violent crimes, property crimes, and other miscellaneous crimes, including the "[v]iolation of the provisions of a restraining order, no-contact order, or protection order." RCW 10.99.020(5)(r). In contrast, RCW 26.50.010(1) defines a domestic violence offense

[2] RCW 9.94A.660.

as assault, sexual assault, or stalking committed by one family or household member against another. *Kozey*, 183 Wn. App. at 697.

Roberts's current offenses were violations of no-contact orders committed against a household member, and his prior domestic violence offenses were attempted assault in the second degree, assault in the fourth degree, and violating a sentencing no-contact order. All of these offenses satisfied the definition of domestic violence in RCW 10.99.020(5). Consequently, under *Kozey*, the trial court properly applied RCW 9.94A.525(21) to Roberts's offender score.

Roberts's disagreement with the analysis in *Kozey* does not warrant its reconsideration. The Supreme Court has denied review of *Kozey*, and other decisions have followed its reasoning. *See, e.g., State v. Hodgins*, No. 31780-3-III, 2015 WL 5771248 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2015); *State v. Ross*, 188 Wn. App. 768, 355 P.3d 306 (2015); *State v. MacDonald*, 183 Wn. App. 272, 333 P.3d 451 (2014). We affirm the trial court's interpretation of RCW 9.94A.030 and its application of the offender score provisions in RCW 9.94A.525(21).[3]

II. FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY

Roberts argues next that the trial court acted without statutory authority when it ordered the forfeiture of any property held by the police department. We review de novo whether the trial court had statutory authority to impose this sentencing condition. *State v. Roberts*, 185 Wn. App. 94, 96, 339 P.3d 995 (2014).

In *Roberts*, we considered an identical claim of error and held that in the absence of a showing that statutory authority supported the forfeiture condition, the condition was imposed in error. 185 Wn. App. at 96. In so holding, we distinguished a decision addressing whether the trial

[3] In doing so, we note that the trial court added a point because Roberts committed his current offenses while he was on community placement, thus giving him an offender score of 12. RCW 9.94A.525(19).

court exceeded its authority by ordering forfeiture without procedural due process. *Roberts*, 185 Wn. App. at 97 (citing *State v. McWilliams*, 177 Wn. App. 139, 152, 311 P.3d 584 (2013), *review denied*, 179 Wn.2d 1020 (2014)). In *McWilliams*, we rejected the defendant's due process challenge because his ability to move for return of the property under both the provisions of the judgment and sentence and CrR 2.3(e) afforded him due process. 177 Wn. App. at 150-151. The *McWilliams* decision did not hold that the trial court could order forfeiture in the absence of statutory authority. *Roberts*, 185 Wn. App. at 997.

The *Roberts* decision expressly held that a trial court may not order forfeiture without statutory authority and we apply that holding here. The judgment and sentence does not cite any statutory authority to support the forfeiture condition, and the State does not supply such authority on appeal. Accordingly, we remand to strike the forfeiture language from the judgment and sentence.

III. SAG

Roberts raises two issues in his SAG. The first contends that the exclusion of a prior misdemeanor for a protection order violation shows that his offender score was miscalculated.

Roberts was convicted of the protection order violation in 2012. This conviction is not labelled as a domestic violence offense in his current judgment and sentence. Consequently, we see no error in its exclusion from Roberts's offender score.[4]

Roberts also contends that the provisions in RCW 9.94A.525(21) should have applied to the calculation of his offender score for his 2012 conviction of domestic violence attempted assault

[4] We also note that Roberts's judgment and sentence lists his offender score as 9+ and his standard range as the maximum 60 months. Neither of these references would change with the addition of a point to the offender score.

in the second degree. The calculation of Roberts's offender score under a prior cause number is beyond the scope of this appeal, and we do not consider this issue further.

We remand for the trial court to strike the forfeiture provision from the judgment and sentence, but otherwise affirm.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.

Melnick, J.

We concur:

Bjorgen, A.C.J.

Maxa, J.

RUSSELL SELK LAW OFFICES

December 24, 2015 - 2:27 PM

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